On 1 October 2026 the US Treasury went after one of the most important sanctions-evasion channels in the world. OFAC designated the A7 Network, a Russia-linked shadow banking system, as a significant transnational criminal organisation. On the same day, FinCEN, the US financial crime unit, proposed a rule against the network's "sub-agents" and issued an alert to financial institutions.

What A7 is

According to FDD's policy brief, A7 was set up by the sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank and the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, and is used by Iran and Iran-backed groups to move money around sanctions. It relies on a ruble-backed stablecoin called A7A5, which FinCEN describes as non-freezable. Value is moved into the Tether stablecoin USDT, and then into cash through exchanges and over-the-counter brokers.

The scale is large. FinCEN estimates the network has touched about 435 financial institutions in at least 83 countries. It says sub-agent transactions came to more than US$17 billion between January 2025 and June 2026. ICBA reports that more than 180 entities processed A7A5 transactions worth at least US$179 billion between February 2025 and June 2026.

The sub-agent problem

Sub-agents are the screening headache. They are third-country front companies that act as the paying party, so the real Russian or Iranian customer never appears in the payment chain. A vendor summary of the action says FinCEN names six, all based in the United Arab Emirates, and would share the rest privately.

Think about what that does to a standard screening process. Your system checks the names on the payment against a list. The sub-agent is a perfectly ordinary-looking trading company with a clean record, unless someone has added it to a list. The risk sits in the relationship between the parties, and no name match will find it.

What the rule would do, and what it will not

The proposed rule would stop covered institutions from sending or receiving funds linked to sub-agents. It is a proposal, not law. A vendor summary of the action says there is a 30-day comment period after publication, so check the Federal Register notice before relying on any detail.

Australian institutions are not bound by a US rule as such. But anyone who clears US dollars, holds US correspondent accounts, or screens against OFAC lists as a matter of policy should assume the designation will reach them. Australia's own sanctions rules are separate, and your legal team should confirm how they interact.

What to do now

First, load the A7 designations into your screening tool, and make sure aliases and related entities come with them. Second, look at your higher-risk business customers for FinCEN's red flags. Companies formed recently, trading firms with thin activity, and logins from VPNs are the examples given. Third, ask whether your onboarding captures who actually controls a business, rather than only who owns it on paper. Fourth, review how your analysts handle stablecoin payments, particularly USDT moving to or from exchanges in the UAE, Hong Kong or Central Asia.

The honest message is that sanctions screening has become a judgement exercise. The lists tell you who is already known. The A7 case is a reminder that the newest, most useful channels are designed to look unremarkable.

Want to practise this yourself? Work through realistic name-matching and payment-screening decisions in Praxana's Sanctions Screening module.